Lincoln the Louse

The deference reserved for President Lincoln nowadays is unparalleled. According to the collective unconscious of America, Lincoln, the dignified abolitionist, freed the blacks from their oppressive masters via the noble and necessary War Between the States. Yet, Lincoln was hardly sensitive to the plight of blacks and, no, the war was hardly noble or even legal for that matter. Still, people see Lincoln as some magnanimous giant of a man that deserves to be mythologized. I'm here to say that he was far from being as beneficent and as principled as the Cincinnatus we have made him out to be.

I'll begin by asking Lincoln's defenders one question: How does one man become remembered as the quintessential defender of Freedom, while armed with the record of a despot? I ask this in all seriousness because his methods did nothing but constrain freedom, yet his name has remained pristine after all these years. Maybe he didn't curtail elections during wartime like a full-fledged dictator would have, but he did plenty to convince me that he now deserves the sharpest repudiation.

Under Lincoln, civil liberties were nullified. Freedom of the press was trampled after Lincoln managed to shut down 300 "disloyal" newspapers. Even the telegraph lines were censored by Lincoln and guns forcibly removed from the Border States (source).

According to historian Mark Neelly Jr, 1 of every 1500 Northern citizens was arrested for political dissent while being stripped of their right to due process. Within the first year of the war alone, Neelly concluded that nearly 73% of these arbitrary arrests came from the slave states (source). Most ironic was the unlawful imprisonment of Maryland legislator Frank Key Howard: After Lincoln arrested him without a warrant, he was held without charges at Fort McHenry, the bombardment of which had inspired Howard's grandfather, Francis Scott Key, to write the Star-Spangled Banner. In addition to Howard, dozens of other state legislators in Maryland were imprisoned for considering voting for secession. Lincoln even deported Congressman Vallandigham for speaking in opposition to "King Lincoln" in Ohio and placed a Federal Circuit Court judge, William Matthew Merrick, under house arrest without salary simply for granting habeas corpus. And if it weren't for a mindful federal marshal, Ward Hill Lamon, that convinced Lincoln to desist, Supreme Justice Taney would also have been arrested for his antagonistic ruling on habeas corpus. Arresting dissenters, whether they be commoners or legislators and doing it without a warrant or a right to a fair trial is definitively dictatorial!

Unconstitutionality abounded under Lincoln. Really, one could provide the argument that George W. Bush simply followed in Lincoln's putrescent footsteps. Maybe the most revealing example of the Lincoln administration's unmitigated corruption came when Lincoln's Secretary of State William Seward told British ambassador Lord Lyons, "I can touch a bell on my right hand and order the arrest of a citizen in Ohio. I can touch the bell again and order the arrest of a citizen in New York. Can Queen Victoria do as much?" (source).

While I may simply have a penchant for disassembling treasured political myths, numerous historians have also labelled Honest Abe a dictator as well. The late University of Illinois historian James G. Randall classified Lincoln as a "benevolent dictator". William Archibald Dunning characterized Lincoln's reign as a "temporary dictatorship". James Ford Rhodes reassured us that the power of a dictator had never before "fallen into safer and nobler hands." In his essay, "War and the Constitution: Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt", Arthur Schlesinger awkwardly portrays Lincoln's tactics as being despotic but not quite despotic enough to label him a dictator: "Lincoln set in motion a series of drastic though often inept ad hoc actions: martial law and military courts, some far from the fighting fronts; detectives (the twentieth century learned to call them secret police) and paid informers; military arrest and detention of untold thousands of persons; suppression of newspapers; seizure of property; denial of the mails to "treasonable correspondence"... Of course Lincoln was far from a dictator. The mechanisms of accountability---Congress, the courts, free elections, substantial freedoms of speech, press and assembly---all remained in place"(source) . The last bit is where Schlesinger's presumably empathy with Lincoln becomes an unbearable distortion of the truth. In his dutiful respect of Congress, Lincoln ignored the law and decided to wage war for 3 months before finally seeking the approval of Congress. Yes, the congressional mechanism remained "in place" but Lincoln saw himself above Congress, at least initially. The Courts were purposefully deceived by the likes of Secretary of State Seward and threatened with reprisal if they contested Lincoln's policies. So, while not dissolved, the courts were most certainly manipulated with threats by Lincoln's administration. It is also ludicrous to believe that civil liberties remained unimpeded during Lincoln's reign. Schlesinger admits to an apparatus that sounds vaguely similar to Nazi Germany: secret police, paid informants, seizure of property, and arrests without warrants. However, such abuses are not egregious enough to shake Schlesinger free from his conventional adoration of the man. Sure, the freedoms of speech and the press were untethered as long as neither disparaged Lincoln enough to arouse his anger. The shutdown of 300 newspapers and the imprisonment of an estimated 30,000 Northerners provides a gloomy enough portrait for me to conclude that Schlesinger was mistaken in his optimistic appraisal of Lincoln.

For generations now, we have been led to believe that Lincoln was simply an idealist and solely yearned for the black man to be free. However, Lincoln didn't really care about the plight of the slaves as much as he did about increasing his power and prosperity at the expense of others. His true aim can be gleaned from a letter he wrote to the influential abolitionist and editor Horace Greeley on August 22, 1862 which read, "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it." Even current Democratic Senator Jim Webb marginalizes Lincoln's role as abolitionist in his book "Born Fighting: A History of the Scots-Irish in America." In his book he observes that "in virtually every major battle of the Civil War, Confederate soldiers who did not own slaves fought against a proportion of Union Army soldiers who had not been asked to give up theirs." This included folks from the states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri. If emancipating the slaves was of primary importance to Lincoln, then why were Union slave owners given a pass?

In actuality, the South decided to secede not in defense of slavery, but as a result of Union protectionism. What merely began as rhetoric in Lincoln's campaign culminated in the imposition of the brutal Morrill tariff. This tariff alone was used to fund 11% of the Union's war effort. The blockade on Southern ports existed solely to forcibly collect such duties.

On April 3, 1861, Lincoln sent a delegate, Allen McGruder, to the Virginia Secession Convention with hopes of keeping them in the Union. Upon arrival, McGruder decided that one representative was to return with him to Washington to speak to Lincoln about the likelihood of secession. The Virginia Convention selected the nascent delegate, Col. John B. Baldwin. In recounting his private exchange with President Lincoln, Baldwin recalls being asked by Lincoln,"But what am I to do in the meantime with those men in Montgomery? Am I to let them go on?" Baldwin replied, "Yes sir, until they can be peacably brought back." Lincoln then divulged his true motive for war when he responded, "And open Charleston, etc., as ports of entry, with their ten percent tariff. What, then would become of my tariff?" Baldwin's account paints a far different picture of Lincoln than the selfless myth many are familiar with. Furthermore, the British were certainly sympathetic to the Southern plight because they jointly bore the tariff burden with their Confederate brethren.

Even Charles Dickens viewed the Morrill tariff as an inherently inflammatory measure to Southerners, "Union means so many millions a year lost to the South; secession means the loss of the same millions to the North. The love of money is the root of this, as of many other evils.… [T]he quarrel between the North and South is, as it stands, solely a fiscal quarrel. But for all of those that choose to toe the line, Karl Marx denied any such claims. He firmly asserted the opposite: "Secession, therefore, did not take place because the Morrill tariff had gone through Congress, but, at most, the Morrill tariff went through Congress because secession had taken place." However, the late Harvard economist Frank Taussig saw things more accurately: "The tariff act of 1861 was passed by the House of Representatives in the session of 1859–60, the session preceding the election of President Lincoln."(source) Fortunately, this should come as no surprise, for Marx certainly had a knack for misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

No records delineating the construction of a Confederate Constitution were preserved that would provide definitive proof of the tariff's impact. Regardless, more informal records do exist. Extensive letters written by a Georgia representative of the Provisional Congress, Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb, to his wife must be counted as the next best source due to his level of involvement. According to economists Robert A. McGuire and T. Norman Van Cott, Cobb's letters indicate that the tariff was of profound importance to the committee. In a letter dated March 4, 1861, Cobb remarked that "the tariff question is troubling us a good deal. The absolute Free Trade principle is very strongly advocated." Lincoln was adamant in raising tariffs that protected Northern industry, and Southerners knew a tariff would spell the demise of the South. In a New York Times editorial published December 7, 1860, such Southern fears were discussed with undeniable cynicism and hostility: "South Carolina starts upon the assumption that upon ignoring the North, she is going to construct a commercial system of her own; send her products to Europe; bring back the proceeds in her own bottoms and make her cities great depots of commerce rivaling New-York. In this way she is to keep her wealth at home, and throw off a dependence which she asserts has sapped her means, and placed her in a state of humiliating vassalage."(source) To deny the importance of the tariff would be foolhardy. Yet, many prominent historians are still convinced that Lincoln was an emancipator and unifier and he simply did what needed to be done in order to thwart the cruel Confederates and thus reunite the country.

Some have rightfully asked why Lincoln never achieved a policy of "compensated emancipation" outside of Washington, D.C. There and only there did he pay $300 a slave to effectively end the local institution of slavery. It's hard to say how the Spanish, British, French and Dutch Empires all successfully implemented "compensated emancipation" without tremendous bloodshed. I'd be curious to study further the economic legacy resting behind such efforts. Lincoln tried desperately to sell the idea of compensated emancipation by claiming that all of the slaves of Missouri, Delaware, Kentucky, Washington. D.C., and Maryland would cost only $173,048,800 which would still be cheaper than 87 days of war priced at $174,000,000. But some found such sums of money impossible to finance without applying extreme tax burdens on their constituents. According to a message from a collective of Border State congressmen dated July 14, 1862, compensated emancipation would have destroyed the South's economy with insurmountably crippling debt: "Many of us doubted the constitutional power of this government to make appropriations of money for the object designated; and all of us, thought our finances were in no condition to bear the immense outlay which its adoption and faithful execution, would impose upon the National Treasury. If we pause but for a moment to think of the debt its acceptance would have entailed, we are appalled by its magnitude. The proposition was addressed to all the States, and embraced the whole number of slaves. According to the Census of 1860, there were then very nearly four millions of slaves in the country; from natural increase they exceed that number now. At even the low average of $300, — the price fixed by the emancipation Act, for the slaves of this District, and greatly below their real worth, — their value runs up to the enormous sum of Twelve Hundred Million of dollars; and if to that be added the cost of deportation and colonization, at $100 each, which is but a fraction more than is actually paid by the Maryland Colonization Society, we have four hundred millions more! We were not willing to impose a tax on our people sufficient to pay the interest on that sum, in addition to the vast and daily increasing debt already fixed upon them by the exigencies of the War; and if we had been willing, the country could not bear it.We were not willing to impose a tax on our people sufficient to pay the interest on that sum, in addition to the vast and daily increasing debt already fixed upon them by the exigencies of the War; and if we had been willing, the country could not bear it. Stated in this form, the proposition is nothing less than the deportation from the country of sixteen hundred million dollars' worth of producing labor, and the substitution in its place of an interest bearing debt of the same amount!"(source). If such calculations are correct, then it would truly be an impossible burden on the South if slaves were purchased by the government, i.e. taxpayer, and deported as suggested. How can anyone be surprised that legislators decried Lincoln's efforts and refused to abandon slavery?

Nowadays, people often say that Lincoln tried a peaceful route and failed and thus was left with no other viable option but war. This is patently false. He could have removed the damaging tariff and allowed the South to trade with Britain as it had in the past. The South only purchased certain goods overseas because the North's alternatives were too expensive and of cheaper quality. In other words, if the North wanted to become economically dominant, it would have needed to make goods better and cheaper than Britain. If this peaceful, free-market route had been pursued, instead of the protectionist path, then it's likely that the South would have rejoined the Union or, at worst, remained separate yet stable trade partners without war.

And while slavery will forever remain a despicable institution, eventually, the institution of slavery would have deteriorated due to an increased reliance on machinery in favor of inefficient human labor. Why continue to hold someone captive that requires food, medical care, and lodging when you could eventually acquire enough capital to replace him with incentivized hired labor and more efficient machinery that needn't be forcibly corralled? Everyone should read economist Gordon Tullock's succinct libertarian classic, "The Economics of Slavery", to get a better understanding of slave labor's defining characteristics (source) Just think of the modern automotive industry and its reliance on robotic assembly lines. Now juxtapose that with the image of the Studebaker brothers toiling at the foundry, working at a lugubrious pace on a wagon wheel. Contrast that further with an unmotivated workforce constituted of slaves constructing that said wagon wheel. The process becomes slower due to the lack of incentives for the labor and yet it's just as costly because one has to ensure that the slaves don't flee or revolt in the meantime. A necessary criterion of a unhampered free market is that inefficient, labor-intensive methods are phased out in favor of more efficient, cost-effective methods. We all want the greatest return with the least amount of effort. But to uproot the Southern economy instantaneously and deport its labor force before the necessary capital could be acquired to hire labor and build machinery of such magnitude would lead to utter destitution. Who would consent to that when it's not necessary? At least in war, the South had the potential to emerge victorious by defending their property as they rightfully should have.

Once the states had seceded, Lincoln and staff then embarked on a deceitful ploy to lure the South into firing the first shot. The war was initiated over Lincoln's desire to provide reinforcements to Union officer Major Anderson at Fort Sumter. Initially, Lincoln sought Major Anderson's abandonment of Fort Sumter and the Confederacy agreed to do no harm during the evacuation.

On April 1, 1861, Justice John Campbell met with Secretary of State Seward to confirm the abandonment of Fort Sumter. He left that meeting feeling as though Lincoln was venturing down a different and more treacherous path. Seward claimed that the President now wanted to send ships stocked only with food and provisions to Major Anderson's troops so as to relieve their torturous hunger. Yet, the men could not have been been hungry, because the city of Charleston was already feeding them until April 7th when it was confirmed that Union provisions would be arriving by April 12th at the latest. It seemed as if vilifying the brutish and insensitive Confederates was just a means to emotionalize the need for war in the North. Still, Seward placated Justice Campbell by reaffirming that Sumter's evacuation would happen soon enough.

The Confederacy only received notice of impending war when the mail was collected on April 7th. On April 7th, Major Anderson received a letter from Lincoln that notified Anderson that Lincoln was actually sending troops to reinforce Fort Sumter. Of course, this was not agreed upon by the Confederacy and was an act of pure deception on Lincoln's part. In the confiscated mail was a letter addressed to Lincoln from Major Anderson which read, "We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced." Such a revelation certainly must have startled those that read Anderson's letter. On April 12th, Major Anderson was asked to evacuate or be subject to attack. He refused to leave and bombardment commenced later that day. In his book "The Coming Fury", noted civil war historian Bruce Catton describes how Lincoln manipulated the South into making the first move: ["Lincoln had been plainly warned by Lamon and by Hurlbut that a ship taking provisions to Fort Sumter would be fired on. Now he was sending the ship, with advance notice to the men who had the guns. He was sending war ships and soldiers as well, but they would remain in the background; if there was going to be a war it would begin over a boat load of salt pork and crackers---over that, and the infinite overtones which by now were involved. Not for nothing did Captain Fox remark afterward that it seemed very important to Lincoln that South Carolina "should stand before the world as having fired upon bread."] Justice Campbell vocalized his profound disappointment with the administration by writing Seward: "I think no candid man who will read what I have written and consider for a moment what is going on at Sumter but will agree that the equivocating conduct of the Administration, as measured and interpreted in connection with these promises, is the proximate cause of the great calamity." Further evidence of Lincoln's deception comes from Lincoln's personal secretaries, John G. Nicolay and John Hay. In their biography of Lincoln, they penned this telling passage: "President Lincoln in deciding the Sumter question had adopted a simple but effective policy. To use his own words, he determined to "send bread to Anderson"; if the rebels fired on that, they would not be able to convince the world that he had begun civil war. All danger of misapprehension, all accusations of "invasion" and "subjugation," would fall to the ground before that paramount duty not only to the nation, but to humanity."(source). This provides the starkest evidence of manipulation. The Confederacy either had to submit and be conquered by the Union or they could do the honorable thing and fight for their homes, despite risking complete vilification for having thwarted the feeding of starving men. At which point, the Union would use such "inhumane" action as a means to obliterate the South. What options!

Still, there is further evidence of malfeasance recorded by Lincoln's close friend Senator Orville Browning. On July 3, 1861, the night before Lincoln decided to acquire the consent of Congress, Lincoln met with Senator Browning in private to discuss the address Lincoln had prepared to deliver Congress the following day. Afterwards, Browning made it a point to detail the conversation in his personal diary. In it he wrote: "He told me that the very first thing placed in his hands after his inauguration was a letter from Major Anderson announcing the impossibility of defending or relieving Sumter. That he called the cabinet together and consulted General Scott---that Scott concurred with Anderson, and the cabinet with the exception of PM General Blair were for evacuating the Fort, and all the troubles and anxieties of his life had not equalled those which intervened between this time and the fall of Sumter. He himself conceived the idea, and proposed sending supplies, without an attempt to reinforce giving notice of the fact that Governor Pickens of S.C. The plan succeeded. They [the Confederates] attacked Sumter--it fell, and thus, did more service than it otherwise could."(source).

According to Browning, Lincoln's cabinet largely opposed the maneuver and yet the near-unilateral plan was still put into action. Some historians such as Charles W. Ramsdell treat such an account as evidence too, while others remain less convinced. The late historian Allan Nevins was of the belief that Browning's words "cannot be regarded as literally accurate." I'd say that his documenting the event on the very day it happened makes it more likely to be accurate than not. Still, others such as the Southern historian, David M. Potter, pondered whether Browning even heard the President correctly. I suppose that's possible, but in regards to the Nicolay and Hay passage and Lincoln's laundry list of abuses of executive power, I'd say, again, that it's far more likely that he heard him well enough.

So how did Lincoln get away with such abuse and yet remain unscathed? He won. It's as simple as that. If the South had emerged victorious then Lincoln would have likely been impeached and hung for propagating such unconstitutional and wanton destruction. Nixon's presidency would be reappraised as being innocuous in comparison to the era of that tryant Lincoln. And he would have been rightfully tossed into the dustbin of history. People need to reflect on his record and not the mythos that bears no likeness to the truth of the matter. If a liberal comes away from my analysis without vacillation then I'd say he was a hypocrite.

One cannot condemn Bush's suspension of habeas corpus or his defiant assertion of executive privilege during wartime and not condemn Lincoln as well. Yes, times were different. Yes, Lincoln's dilemma was far more grave. Still, Bush apologists could counter by saying that our modern enemies, with their modern weaponry, require far greater vigilance than was required during Lincoln's day. The elegant response is to decry the methods of both. Their tactics can be seen in the very least, to borrow Schlesinger's description of Lincoln's policies, as "quasi-dictatorial". Still, that's too dictatorial to deserve my unflinching adulation.